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The remarkable success of machine learning has fostered a growing number of cloud-based intelligent services for mobile
users. Such a service requires a user to send data, e.g. image, voice and video, to the provider, which presents a serious
challenge to user privacy. To address this, prior works either obfuscate the data, e.g. add noise and remove identity information,
or send representations extracted from the data, e.g. anonymized features. They struggle to balance between the service utility
and data privacy because obfuscated data reduces utility and extracted representation may still reveal sensitive information.
This work departs from prior works in methodology: we leverage adversarial learning to better balance between privacy
and utility. We design a representation encoder that generates the feature representations to optimize against the privacy
disclosure risk of sensitive information (a measure of privacy) by the privacy adversaries, and concurrently optimize with the
task inference accuracy (a measure of utility) by the utility discriminator. The result is the privacy adversarial network (PAN),
a novel deep model with the new training algorithm, that can automatically learn representations from the raw data. And the
trained encoder can be deployed on the user side to generate representations that satisfy the task-defined utility requirements
and the user-specified/agnostic privacy budgets.
Intuitively, PAN adversarially forces the extracted representations to only convey information required by the target task.
Surprisingly, this constitutes an implicit regularization that actually improves task accuracy. As a result, PAN achieves better
utility and better privacy at the same time! We report extensive experiments on six popular datasets, and demonstrate the
superiority of PAN compared with alternative methods reported in prior work.
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing→ Ubiquitous and mobile computing systems and tools; • Security
and privacy→ Usability in security and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has benefited numerous mobile services, such as speech-based assistant (e.g. Siri), reading log
enabled book recommendation (e.g. Youboox). Many such services submit user data, e.g. sound, image, and human
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activity records, to the service provider, posing well-known privacy risks [1, 2, 9]. Our goal is to avoid disclosing
raw data to service providers by creating a device-local intermediate component that encodes the raw data and
only sends the encoded data to the service provider. And the encoded data must be both useful and private. For
inference-based services, utility can be quantified by the inference accuracy, achieved by the service provider
using a discriminative model. And Privacy can be quantified by the disclosure risk of private information.
Existing solutions addressing the privacy concern struggle to balance between above two seemingly conflicting
objectives: privacy vs. utility. An obvious and widely practiced solution is to transform the raw data into task-
specific features and upload features only, like Google Now [17] and Google Cloud [16]; This not only reduces
the data utility but also is vulnerable to reverse models that reconstruct the raw data from extracted features [28].
The authors of [33] additionally apply dimensionality reduction, Siamese fine-tuning, and noise injection to the
features before sending them to the service provider. This unfortunately result in further loss in utility.
Unlike previous work, we employ deep models and adversarial training to automatically learn features for a
sweet tradeoff between privacy and utility. Our key idea is to judiciously combine the discriminative learning, for
minimizing the task-specific discriminative error as well as maximizing the user-specified privacy discriminative
error, and the generative learning, for maximizing the agnostic privacy reconstruction error. Specifically, we
present the Privacy Adversarial Network (PAN), an end-to-end deep model, and its training algorithm. PAN
controls three types of descent gradients, i.e., utility discriminative error, privacy discriminative error, and privacy
reconstruction error, in back propagation to guide the training of a feature extractor.
As shown in Fig. 2, a PAN consists of four parts: a feature extractor (Encoder E(·)), a utility discriminator
(UD), an adversarial privacy reconstructor (PR), and an adversarial privacy discriminator (PD). The output of
the Encoder (E) feeds to the input of the utility discriminator (UD), privacy reconstructor (PR), and privacy
discriminator (PD). We envision the Encoder (E) runs in mobile devices to extract features from raw data. The
utility discriminator (UD) represents the inference service to ensure the utility of extracted features. PAN emulates
two types of adversarials to ensure the privacy: the privacy discriminator (PD) emulates a malicious party that
seeks to extract private information, e.g. user location; the privacy reconstructor (PR) emulates one that seeks to
reconstruct raw data from the features. We present a novel algorithm to explicitly train PAN via an adversarial
process that alternates between i.e., training the Encoder with the utility discriminator (UD) to improve the utility
and confronting the Encoder with the adversaries of privacy discriminator (PD) and privacy reconstructor (PR) to
enhance the privacy. All four parts iteratively evolve with others during the training phase. Understood from the
perspective of manifold, the separate flows of gradients from utility discriminator (UD), privacy discriminator
(PD), and privacy reconstructor (PR) through the Encoder in back-propagation can iteratively produces the
feature manifold that is both useful and private.
Using digit recognition (MNIST [25]), image classification (CIFAR-10[23] and ImageNet [6]), sound sensing
(Ubisound [37]), human activity recognition (Har [40]), and driver behavior prediction (StateFarm [21]), we show
PAN is effective in training the Encoder to generate deep features that provide better privacy-utility tradeoff than
other privacy preserving methods. Surprisingly, we observe that the adversarially learned features to remove
redundant information, for privacy, even surpass the recognition accuracy of discriminatively learned features.
That is, removing task-irrelevant information for privacy actually improves generalization and as a result, utility.
In the rest of the paper, we formulate the problem of utility-privacy tradefoff in § 2 and present the PAN’s design
and its training algorithm in § 3. We report an evaluation of PAN in § 4. We attempt a theoretic interpretation of
PAN in § 5, review the related work in § 6, and conclude in § 7.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION OF MOBILE DATA PRIVACY PRESERVING
This section mathematically formulates the problem of utility-privacy tradeoff for mobile data. Many appealing
cloud-based services exist today that require data from mobile users. For example, as shown in Fig 1, a user takes
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Fig. 1. Privacy preservation in cloud-based mobile services. Mobile users leverage a learned Encoder to locally generate
deep features from the raw data (i.e., "tea bag" picture) and give them to the App. The App may send the features to its
cloud-based backend.
a picture of a product and sends it to a cloud-based service to find out how to purchase it, a service Amazon
actually provides. The picture, on the other hand, can accidentally contain sensitive information, e.g., face and
other identifying objects in the background. Therefore, the user faces a touch challenge: how to obtain the service
without trusting the service provider with the sensitive information?
Toward addressing this challenge, our key insight is that most services actually do not need the raw data. The
user can encode raw data I into representation E(I ) through an Encoder E(·) on the mobile device and only sends
E(I ) to the service provider. The representation E(I ) ideally should have the following two properties:
• Utility: it must contain enough task-relevant information to be useful for the intended service, e.g., high
accuracy for object recognition;
• Privacy: it must have little task-irrelevant information, especially that is considered sensitive by the user.
In this work, we focus on classification-based services. Therefore, the utility of E(I ) is measured by the task
inference error Cu (e.g. cross entropy) in the service provider. And we quantify the privacy of E(I ) by the privacy
leak risk Cp of raw data in all possible attacking models X . Since the Encoder is distributed to mobile users, we
assume it is available to both service providers and potential attackers. That is, both the service provider and the
malicious party can train their models using raw data I and their corresponding Encoder output E(I ). As such we
can restate the desirable properties for the Encoder output E(I ) within dataset T as below:
Utility: Min
E
Cu (E(Ii )), i ∈ T
Privacy: Min
E
Max
X
Cp (E(Ii )), i ∈ T (1)
The first objective (Utility) is well-understood for discriminative learning, and achievable via a standard
optimization process on the Encoder (E) and the corresponding specialist discriminative model, i.e., minimizing
the cross entropy between the predicted task label and the ground truth in a supervised manner [24].
The second objective (Privacy) has two parts. The inner part,Max
X
Cp (E(I )), is opposite to the the outer part
Min
E
Cp (E(I )). Therefore, the Encoder (E) employed by the mobile user and the specialist attacker (X ) used by the
malicious party is adversarial to each other in their optimization objectives. Given the information loss in E(I ) for
privacy, utility loss appears to be certain in theory. One would only hope to find a good, ideally Pareto-optimal,
tradeoff between privacy and utility in devising E(·). However, as we will show later, E(·) discovered via PAN
actually improves privacy and utility at the same time, a result that can be explained by the practical limits of
deep learning in §5.
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Important to the quantification of privacy, one must enumerate the privacy leak risks Cp by all possible
attackers X in theory. Moreover, the measurement of the privacy leak risk Cp is an open problem in itself [30].
Therefore, we approximate privacy with two specific attackers, each with its own measurement of privacy,
elaborated below.
(1) Specified privacy quantification in which the user specifies what inference tasks should be forbidden and
privacy can be quantified by the accuracy of these tasks. For example, users may want to prevent a malicious
party from inferring their identity. In this case, the privacy can be measured by the inaccuracy of identify
inference. In this case, the privacy leak riskCp1 can be defined as the inference accuracy by a discrimination
model employed by the attacker.
(2) Intuitive privacy quantification in which the privacy leakage risk Cp2 is agnostic of the inference tasks
under taken by the attacker. In this work, we quantify this agnostic privacy by the difference between
the raw data, I , and I ′, data reconstructed by a malicious party from the Encoder output E(I ). We choose
this reconstruction error as the agnostic measure for two reasons. First, the raw data in theory contains
all information and difference between I and I ′ is computationally straightforward and intuitive. Second,
prior works have already shown that it is possible to reconstruct the raw data from feature representations
optimized for accuracy [28, 35, 43].
3 DESIGN OF PAN
To find a good, hopefully Pareto-optimal tradeoff between utility and privacy, we design PAN to learn an Encoder
E(·) via a careful combination of discriminative, generative, and adversarial training. As we will show in §4, to
our surprise, the resulting Encoder actually improves utility and privacy at the same time.
3.1 Architecture of PAN
As shown in Fig 2, PAN employs two additional neural network modules, utility discriminator (UD) and privacy
attacker, to quantify utility and privacy, respectively, in training the Encoder E(·). The utility discriminator
simulates the intended classification service; when PAN is trained by the service provider, the utility discriminator
can be the same discriminative model used by the service. The privacy attacker, i.e., the intuitive privacy
reconstructor (PR) and the specified privacy discriminator (PD), simulates a malicious attacker that attempts to
obtain sensitive information from the encoded features E(I ). These modules are end-to-end trained to learn the
Encoder E(·) for users to extract deep features E(I ) from raw data I . The training is an iterative process that we
will elaborate in §3.2. Below we first introduce PAN’s neural network architecture, along with some empirically
gained design insights.
• TheEncoderE(·) consists of an input layer, multiple convolutional layers, pooling layers, and batch-normalization
layers. The convolution layer applies a convolution operation to output activation map with a set of trainable
filters. We note that the clever usage of pooling layers and batch-normalization layers contribute to the deep
feature’s utility and privacy. The batch-normalization layer normalizes the outputted activation map of a
previous layer by subtracting the batch mean and dividing by the batch standard deviation [20]. It helps the
features’ utility because it normalizes the activation to avoid being too high or too low thus has a regularization
effect [20]. It contributes to features’ privacy as well since it makes it harder for an attacker to recover sensitive
information from normalized features. And then, the pooling layer adopts a maximum or average value from
a sub-region of the previous layer to form more compact features, which reduces the computational error
and avoids over-fitting [12]. It helps privacy because none of un-pooling techniques can recover fine details
from the resulting features through shifting small parts to precisely arranging them into a larger meaningful
structure [31].
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the privacy adversarial network (PAN). The error Cu , Cp1, and Cp2, which respectively refer to the
utility quantification, the specified privacy quantification and the intuitive privacy quantification, build the weight updating
criterion during back-propagation.
• The Utility Discriminator (UD) builds a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) to process deep features E(I ) and
output the task classification results y ′ with several full-connected layers [24]. We also note that a service
provider can explore any classification architectures for its utility discriminator model, given the Encoder or
its binary version. We choose the MLP architecture because some of the most successful CNN architectures,
e.g. VGG and AlexNet, can be viewed as the Encoder plus an MLP. The standard cross entropy between the
utility discriminator’s prediction output y ′ and the task ground truth y measures the utility error Cu .
• The Privacy Attacker employs the two privacy attacking models presented at the end of §2. Specifically, the
privacy discriminator (PD) evaluates the recognition accuracy of private class from encoded features E(I ). And
the privacy reconstructor (PR) quantifies the intuitive reconstruction error between mimic data I ′ and raw
data I .
– Specified Privacy Discriminator (PD) employs a similar MLP classifier as the utility discriminator
(UD) to predict the user-specified privacy class z ′, e.g. personal identity, from features E(I ). The difference is
that the multi-layer PD maps to the corresponding private classes. As noted before, the architecture and
training algorithm of PAN can easily incorporate other architectures as the privacy discriminator (PD). The
error between the predicted private class z ′ and the privacy label z measures the specified privacy leak risk
Cp2.
– Intuitive Privacy Reconstructor (PR) is a usual Encoder turned upside down, composed of multiple
un-pooling layers and deconvolutional layers. The un-pooling operation is realized by feature resizing or
nearest-value padding [28]. And then the Deconvolution layer densifies the sparse activation obtained by
un-pooling through reverse convolution operations [42]. The PR simulates a malicious party and quantifies
the intuitive privacy error Cp1. After obtaining a (binary) version of the Encoder, a malicious party is free to
explore any neural architectures to reconstruct the raw data. In this work, we examine multiple reconstructor
architectures and select the one with the lowest reconstruction error as the specialist privacy reconstructor.
And we also include an exactly layer-to-layer reversed architecture to mirror the Encoder, to emulate
a powerful adversarial reconstructor that knows the internals of the Encoder throughout training. The
reconstruction error, e.g. Euclidean distance, between I and I ′ measures the disclosure risk Cp1 of agnostic
privacy information.
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Algorithm 1:Mini-batch stochastic training of privacy adversarial network (PAN)
Input: Dataset T
Output: PAN’s Weights {θE ,θUD ,θPD ,θPR }
1 Initialize θE ,θUD ,θPD ,θPR ;
2 for n epochs do
3 Sample mini-batch I ofm samples from T;
4 for k steps do
5 Update θe and θUD by gradient ascent with learning rate l1: minimize Cu ;
6 Update θPD by gradient ascent with learning rate l2: minimize Cp1 ;
7 Update θPR by gradient ascent with learning rate l3: minimize Cp2 ;
8 end
9 Update θE and θUD by gradient ascent with learning rate l4: minimize Csum ;
10 end
11 *Note: n and k are two hyper-parameters to synchronize the training of E, UD, PD, and PR parts.
3.2 Training Algorithm of PAN
Our goal with PAN is to train an Encoder that can produce output that is both useful, i.e., leading to high inference
accuracy when used for classification tasks, and private, i.e., leading to low privacy inference accuracy and high
reconstructive error when maliciously processed and reversely engineered by the attacker, respectively. As we
noted in §2, the utility and privacy objectives can be competing when taken naively. The key idea of the PAN’s
training algorithm is to train the Encoder along with the utility discriminator and the two types of privacy
attackers, which specialize in discrimination and reconstruction, respectively. Given a training dataset T ofm
pairs of I , the raw data, y, the true task label, and z, the privacy label, we train a PAN through an iterative process
with the following four stages:
(1) Discriminative training mainly maximizes the accuracy to train a specialist utility discriminator (UD);
mathematically, it minimizes the cross entropy τ between predicted classUD(E(Ii )) and true label yi :
Min Cu =
m∑
i=1
τ (yi ,UD(E(Ii ))). (2)
(2) Discriminative training minimizes the cross entropy τ between predicted private class PD(E(Ii )) and private
ground truth zi , to primarily train a specialist privacy discriminator (PD):
Min Cp1 =
m∑
i=1
τ (zi , PD(E(Ii ))) (3)
(3) Generative training minimizes the reconstructive error to train a specialist privacy reconstructor (PR):
Min Cp2 =
m∑
i=1
|Ii − PR(E(Ii ))|2 (4)
(4) Adversarial training minimizes the sum error to find a privacy-utility tradeoff. Specifically, it trains the
Encoder to suppress utility error Cu and increase privacy error (Cp1,Cp2):
Min Csum =
m∑
i=1
λ1τ (yi ,UD(E(Ii ))) − λ2 |Ii − PR(E(Ii ))|2 − λ3τ (zi , PD(E(Ii ))) (5)
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Table 1. Summary of the mobile applications and corresponding datasets for evaluating PAN.
No. Target task (utility label) Private attribute (privacy label) Dataset Description
T1 Digit (10 classes) None MNIST [25] 70, 000 images
T2 Image (10 classes) None CIFAR-10 [23] 60, 000 images
T3 Image (5 classes) None ImageNet [6] 65, 000 images
T4 Acoustic event (9 classes) None UbiSound [37] 7, 500 audio clips
T5 Human activity (7 classes) Human identity (33 classes) Har [40] 10, 000 records of accelerometer and gyroscope
T6 Driver behavior (10 classes) Driver idenity (26 classes) StateFarm [21] 22, 424 images
Csum is a Lagrangian function of Cu ,Cp1 and Cp2. λ1, λ2, and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers that can be used
to control the relative importance of privacy and utility. When we set λ2 = 0 or λ3 = 0, PAN only trains
the Encoder to resist against the specified privacy discriminator or the intuitive privacy reconstructor,
respectively.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the training algorithm of PAN. We leverage mini-batch techniques to split the training
data into small batches, over which we calculate the average of the gradient to reduce the variance of gradients,
which balance the training robustness and efficiency (line 3) [26]. Within each epoch, we first perform the
standard discriminative and generative stages (line 5, 6, 7) to initialize the Encoder’s weights θE and train the
specialist utility discriminator (UD), privacy discriminator (PD) and privacy reconstructor (PR). And then, we
perform the adversarial stage (line 9) to shift the utility-privacy tradeoff on the Encoder weight θE tuning. We
note that k in line 4 is a hyper-parameter of the first three stages. These k steps followed by a single iteration
of the forth stage is trying to synchronize the convergence speed of these four training stages well, borrowing
existing techniques in generative adversarial network [13]. Our implementation uses an empirically optimized
value of k = 3. And we leverage the AdamOptimizer [22] with an adaptive learning rate for all four stages (line 5,
6, 7 and 9).
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate PAN’s performance using six classification services for mobile apps, with a focus on
the utility-privacy tradeoff. We compare PAN against alternative methods reported in the literature and visualize
the results for insight into why PAN excels.
4.1 Experiment Setup
Evaluation applications & datasets.We evaluate PAN, especially the resulting Encoder, with six commonly
used mobile applications/services, for which the corresponding benchmark datasets are summarized in Table 1.
Specifically, the target task in T1 (MNIST [25]) is handwritten digit recognition. The agnostic private information
in the real-world raw image may include individual handwritten style and the background paper. We use 50, 000
images for PAN training and 20, 000 images for validation and testing. The target tasks in T2 (CIFAR-10 [23]) and
T3 (ImageNet [6]) are image classification. The agnostic private information in the real-world raw image may
involve background location, color, and brand. We choose 40, 000 images for training and remaining images for
testing in both cases. The target task in T4 (UbiSound [37]) is to recognize acoustic event. The agnostic private
information covers background voice and environment information. We use 6, 000 audio clips for training and
1, 500 audio clips for testing. The target task in T5 (Har [40]) is human activity identification based on the records
of accelerometer and gyroscope. The specified private attribute we intend to hide is useridentity. And the agnostic
private information we expect to protect may contain individual habit. We randomly select 8, 000 records for
training and 2, 000 records for testing. The target task in T6 (StateFarm [21]) is to predict driver behavior. The
specified private attribute we choose is driver identity. And the agnostic private information within the real-world
raw image can be face and gender. We use 18, 000 images for training and 4, 424 images for testing.
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Evaluation models. In PAN, we leverage a utility discriminator (UD), a privacy discriminator (PD), and a
privacy reconstructor (PR) model to train and validate the Encoder (E). In the training phase, we refer to the
successful neural network architectures to build PAN’s Encoder (E), Utility Discriminator (UD) and Privacy
Discriminator (PD) for different types of datasets. For example, according to the sample shape in the datasets, the
LeNet is chosen as the reference forT1,T4 andT5, AlexNet is forT2 andT6, and VGG-16 model is forT3. To evaluate
the learned Encoder in the testing phase, we leverage another set of separately trained Utility Discriminator (UD)
and Privacy Attackers (PD and PR), given PAN’s Encoder output, to simulate the service provider and malicious
parties. In particular, we ensemble multiple optional MLP architectures to simulate the service provider’s Utility
Discriminator (UD) for task recognition, as well as the malicious attacker’s Privacy Discriminator (PD) for private
attribute prediction. These MLP models have different fully-connected architectures by using varying scales of
singular value decomposition, sparse-coding factorization, and global-average computation to replace the initial
fully-connected layers. We also employ multiple generative architectures to select the most powerful one as the
privacy reconstruction attacker (PR). To emulate a powerful adversary that knows the Encoder for the attackers’
training, we include a PR model that exactly mirrors the Encoder for each task.
Prototype implementation. PAN has two phases: an offline phase to train the Encoder, and an online phase
where we deploy the learned Encoder as a middleware on mobile platforms to encode the raw sensor data
into features. In the offline phase, we use the Python library of TensorFlow [38] to train the Encoder, utility
discriminator, privacy discriminator as well as privacy reconstructor using the datasets summarized in Table 1.
And we leverage h5py [5] to separately save the trained models. To speedup the training, we leverage a server
with four Geforce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs with CUDA 9.0. In the online phase, we prototype the mobile-side on the
Android platform, i.e., Xiaomi Mi6 smartphone, using TensorFlow Mobile Framework [15]. And we store the
learned Encoder in the smartphone’s L2-cache using Android’s LuCache API [14], which speeds up the on-device
data encoding. The Encoder intercepts the incoming testing data and encodes it into features, which are then fed
into the corresponding Android Apps for real-word performance evaluation.
4.2 Comparison Baselines
We employ four types of state-of-the-art data privacy preserving baselines to evaluate PAN. The DNN method
provides a high utility standard, and the DP, FL, and Hybrid DNN methods set a strict utility-privacy tradeoff
benchmark for PAN. The detail settings of the baseline approaches and PAN are as below.
• Noisy (DP) method perturbs the raw data I by adding Laplace noise with diverse factors {0.1, 0.2, ...0.9},
and then submit the noisy data I to the service provider. This is a typical local differential privacy (DP)
method [7, 18]. The utility u of noisy data is tested by the task (e.g. the driver behavior in T6) recognition
accuracy in a MLP classifierUC with multiple fully-connected layers. The specified privacy p1 is measured by
the inference accuracy over private attribute (e.g. driver identity in T6) in another MLP classifier PC . And the
intuitive privacy p2 is evaluated by the average information loss, i.e., p2 = avд(|Ii − Ii |2), Ii ∈ Ttest . Here Ttest
is the corresponding testing set within datasets T1 ∼ T6.
• Noisy (FL) method perturbs the data I by adding Gaussian noise N (0,σ 2) with mean 0 and variance σ 2, where
we set σ = 40 according to [34]. The Gaussian noise included in the noisy data I can provide rigorous guarantees
of differential privacy using less local noise. This is widely used in the noisy aggregation scheme of federated
learning (FL) [34, 39]. We test the utility u, the specified privacy p1, and the intuitive privacy p2 of this noisy
data I using the similar methodology as DP baseline.
• DNN method encodes the raw data I into features F using a deep encoder with multiple convolutional and
pooling layers, and expose features F to the service provider [16, 17]. The utility u of DNN features is measured
by the inference accuracy in a classifier UC with multiple fully-connected layers. The specified privacy p1
is tested by the inference accuracy over the private attribute in another privacy classifier PC with multiple
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison of PAN1 with four baselines across six different applications (T1,T2,T3,T4,T5,T6). The
X-axis shows the utility u (i.e., task inference accuracy) tested by the simulated service provider. And Y-axis is the intuitive
reconstruction privacy p2 tested by the simulated malicious attacker, normalized by loд operation. The dashed line sets a
privacy loд(p2) benchmark validated by PAN’s privacy reconstructor.
fully-connected layers. And the intuitive privacy p2 is tested by the reconstruction error in a decoder D with
multiple deconvolutional and unpooling layers, i.e., p2 = |Ii − D(Fi )|2, Ii ∈ Ttest .
• HybridDNNmethod further perturbs the above DNN features through additional lossy processes, i.e., principal
components analysis (PCA) and adding Laplace noise [33] with varying noise factors {0.1, 0.2, ...0.9}, before
delivering them to the service provider. The utility u, the specified privacy p1, and the intuitive privacy p2 of
the perturbed features F ′ is respectively tested by a task classifier, a private attribute classifier, and a decoder,
using the same methodology of the DNN baseline.
• PAN automatically transform raw data I into features, i.e., E(I ), using the learned Encoder E(·). In particular, we
evaluate the following two types of PAN, that are trained to defend against different types of privacy attackers
for different benchmark tasks/datasets (Table 1):
– PAN1 is trained with one privacy attacker, i.e., the Privacy Reconstructor (PR), by setting λ3 = 0 in the
adversarial training objective (Eq.(5)). We train the PAN1 on six datasets (i.e., T1 ∼ T6).
– PAN2 is trained with two privacy attackers, i.e., Privacy Discriminator (PD) and Privacy Reconstructor
(PR), for application datasets accompanied with both utility labels and private attribute labels (i.e., T5 and T6).
The utility u of both PAN1’s and PAN2’s Encoder output are tested by the task inference accuracy in the service
provider’s utility discriminator (UD) using a classifier. The specified privacy p1 of PAN2’s Encoder output is
evaluated by the inference accuracy in the attacker’s privacy discriminator (PD) using a classifier. As for the
intuitive reconstruction privacy p2 in PAN1 and PAN2, we select the most powerful decoder as the privacy
reconstructor (PR) to evaluate it, i.e., p2 = |Ii − PR(E(Ii ))|2, Ii ∈ Ttest .
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Fig. 4. Comparison of PAN2 with four baselines on Har (T5) and StateFarm (T6). X-axis is the utility u (i.e., task inference
accuracy). Y-axis in (a) and (c) represents the specified privacy p1 (i.e., private attribute inference accuracy) normalized by
100 − p1(%). And Y-axis in (b) and (d) is the intuitive privacy p2 normalized by loд operation. The dashed line set the privacy
benchmark validated by PAN’s privacy discriminator in (a) and (c) and privacy reconstructor in (b) and (d).
4.3 Utility vs. Privacy Tradeoffs
This subsection evaluates PAN in terms of the utility u by the service provider and the privacy p1 and p2 by the
malicious attackers, compared with four privacy-preserving baselines (see § 4.2). Figure 3 and Figure 4 summarize
the Pareto fronts of the testing privacy-utility tradeoffs by four baselines and PAN. In this set of experiments, we
train the PAN1 on the six application datasets (T1 ∼ T6) based on utility labels, and train the PAN2 on Har (T5)
and StateFarm (T6) datasets accompanied with both utility labels and private attribute labels (see Table 1).
First, PAN’s Encoder output achieves the best privacy-utility tradeoff, compared to those encoded by other
four baselines. In Figure 3, we see the performance of PAN1’s Encoder output lies in the upper right corner with
maximized utility u and maximized privacy loд(p2) on the digit recognition applications (T1), and lie around the
upper right side with maximized utility u and competitive privacy loд(p2) compared with other four baselines on
image classification applications (T2 andT3) and audio sensing applications (T4). In Figure 4, the PAN2 is also in the
upper right corner with maximized utility u and maximized privacy (100−p1)% or loд(p2) on both human activity
recognition application (T5) and driver behavior prediction application (T6). Here we transform the expected
minimized privacy p1% to the maximized privacy (100−p1)%. When we consider the λ1u +λ2(100−p1)−λ3loд(p2)
as a quantifiable metric of utility-privacy tradeoff, both the PAN1’s and PAN2’s Encoder output achieve the best
tradeoff value according to the default relative importance λ1 = 0.4, λ2 = 0.3 and λ3 = 0.3. While the DNN
method provides unacceptable low privacy, and Hybrid DNN, Noisy (DP) and Noisy (FL) methods offer high
privacy at the cost of utility degradation. Second, the utility (i.e., task inference accuracy) of PAN’s Encoder output
is at least as good as and sometimes even better than the other four baseline methods across different applications.
Specifically, the task inference accuracy by PAN1 is 83.1 ∼ 99.8% on MNIST (T1), 70.5 ∼ 89.3% on CIFAR-10 (T2),
81.8 ∼ 99.2% on ImageNet (T3), 83.6 ∼ 98.1% on UbiSound (T4), 78.6 ∼ 98.5% on Har (T5), and 77.8 ∼ 98.6% on
StateFarm (T6), maintaining at a high level. And the task inference accuracy by PAN2 is 85.1 ∼ 99.3% on Har
(T5) and 87.3 ∼ 99.8% on StateFarm (T6). It is even better than the utility of standard DNN features. Although,
with carefully-calibrated Gaussian noise distribution in Noisy (FL), we observe better utility when using Noisy
(FL) method than that using the Noisy (DP) method. The task inference accuracy in Noisy (DP), Noisy (FL) and
Hybrid DNN baselines is seriously unstable, ranging from 12.8% to 96.7% on different applications, because of the
injected noises. Also, we see the utility of PAN2 on Har and StateFarm is slightly improved than the PAN1 case. It
implies the PAN2 with two adversaries learns better features than PAN1 with only one generative model-based
adversary. Third, PAN’s Encoder output in both PAN1 and PAN2 cases considerably improves the privacy than
the DNN method and achieves the competitive privacy compared with other three baselines. Moreover, the PAN’s
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(a) PAN1 on MNIST (T1) (b) PAN1 on UbiSound (T4) (c) PAN2 on Har (T5) (d) PAN2 on StateFarm (T6)
Fig. 5. We can tune the utility-privacy tradeoff in both PAN1 and PAN2 by selecting different Lagrange multipliers λ in the
adversarial training phase (Eq.(5)).
privacy p1 and p2 quantified by PAN’s privacy discriminator (PD) and privacy reconstructor (PR) (the dashed
lines in Figure 3,4) is comparable with that measured by the third-party attackers (solid black triangles in Figure
3,4). We train the third-party attackers using the binary version of PAN’s Encoder. This result demonstrates the
strong adversary ability of PAN’s privacy discriminator and privacy reconstructor.
Summary. First, although the PAN1 and PAN2 cannot always outperform the baseline methods in both utility
and privacy, it achieves the best Pareto front for the utility-privacy tradeoffs across various adversaries and
applications. Second, the utility, i.e., inference accuracy, of PAN’s Encoder output is even better than taht of the
standard DNN. We will revisit this surprising result in § 4.6 and § 5.
4.4 Impact of the Lagrangian Multipliers
An important step in PAN’s training is to determine the Lagrangian multipliers λ1, λ2,andλ3 in the adversarial
training stage (see Eq.(5)). We verify that we are able to tune PAN’s utility-privacy tradeoff point through setting
different λ1, λ2, and λ3 in adversarila training phase (see Eq.(1)), shown in Figure 5. Let λ3 = 0 and λ2 = 1− λ1, we
show evaluate the influence of Lagrangian multiplier on PAN1 tradeoff performance over two typical applications
(e.g. T1 and T4), with five discrete choices of λ1 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. As for PAN2, empirically assuming
λ3 = 0.2 and λ2 = 1− 0.2− λ1, we compare six discrete choices of λ1 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6}. And we see that
the optimal choice of Lagrange multiplier, among above optional space, is λ1 = 0.3 for PAN1 on digit classification
(T1: MNIST), is λ1 = 0.7 for PAN1 on non-speech sound recognition (T4: Ubisound), is λ1 = 0.2 for PAN2 on
human activity detection (T5: Har), and λ1 = 0.6 for PAN2 on driver behavior classification (T6: StateFarm).
Summary. The Lagrange multipliers λ1, λ2, and λ3 bring flexibility to PAN to satisfy different requirements of
utility-privacy tradeoffs according to the relative importance between utility and privacy budgets across various
tasks/applications. And we note it is exhaustive to search the optimal λ1, λ2 and λ3, since we can always search
it from a finer-grained discrete space (e.g. {0.0001, 0.0002, ..., 0.799}). An alternative in the future work is to
leverage the automated search technique, e.g. deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm, for efficient searching.
4.5 Performance on Smartphone
We next evaluate PAN on a commercial off-the-shelf smartphone with six Android applications.
4.5.1 Resource Cost of PAN’s Encoder on Smartphone. This subsection evaluates the run-time execution cost
(e.g. latency, storage, and energy consumption) of the learned PAN’s Encoder for encoding different formats of
data on the Xiaomi Mi6 smartphone. Specifically, we deploy the learned Encoder on the smartphone to interrupt
and encode the incoming testing sample into features (i.e., Encoder output). And then the Encoder output is
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Table 2. Resource cost of PAN’s Encoder for data encoding across five Android applications on Xiaomi Mi6 smartphone.
Applications Encoder’s Cost on Xiaomi Mi6 SmartphoneLatency (ms ) Storage (KB) Energy (m J )
Digit recognition (T1: MNIST) 26 135 0.8
Image classification (T2: CIFAR-10) 31 198 1.6
Image classification (T3: ImageNet) 102 310 3.2
Acoustic event recognition (T4: Ubisound) 42 213 1.8
Human activity prediction (T5: Har) 27 269 0.9
Table 3. Performance on the driver behavior recognition Android App. Utility u is the driver behavior recognition accuracy,
specified privacy p1 is the driver identity classification accuracy, and intuitive privacy p2 is the data reconstruction error.
Input to App Utility u (%) Specified privacy p1 (%) Intuitive privacy loд(p2)
Case A: Raw image 98.2 93.6 0
Case B: DNN features 96.1 65.6 0.035
Case C: PAN’s Encoder output 99.1 23.1 0.163
fed into the corresponding Android Apps for task recognition and privacy validation. In this experiment, the
task classifier is embedded in the corresponding Android App, and the privacy validation models (i.e., private
attribute classifier and privacy reconstructor) are executed on the cloud to attack the Encoder output collected by
Android APP. We summarize the on-device execution cost of PAN’s Encoder to encode five formats of data in
Table 2. In particular, we load the PAN’s Encoder (parameters and architecture files) in the smartphone cache to
speedup processing, since it only occupies ≤ 310KB storage. And the multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations of
the Encoder network are run using smartphone CPU [37]. PAN’s Encoder occupies only 135 ∼ 310KB of memory,
takes 26 ∼ 102ms of encoding latency, and incurs 0.8 ∼ 3.2mJ of energy cost for each encoding pass of raw data.
Summary. PAN’s Encoder does not incur notable high resource cost. Therefore it is compact to deploy
on the resource-constrained mobile platforms as a data preprocessing middleware. In particular, it takes low
memory usage since the Encoder only contains convolutional layers, without storage-exhaustive fully-connected
layers. The execution delay is only several milliseconds [27]. And the energy cost is less than ≤ 3.2mJ , which is
insignificant compared with Xiaomi Mi6’s battery capacity, i.e., 3350mAh.
4.5.2 Case studies on driver behavior recognition App. The user inputs data to an Android App to recognize
driver behavior. Meanwhile, he wants to hide the private attributes (e.g. the driver identity) and other agnostic
private information (e.g. the driver race and car model). Therefore, he leverages PAN to encode the raw image
into features and only deliver the Encoder output to the Android App. We artificially play an example trace of
the driver behavior during the study with 80 driver images from 10 drivers, selected from 4, 424 testing samples
of StateFarm (T6). We consider 3 cases of the input data to the driver behavior recognition Android App: Case A:
raw data, Case B: features generated by a standard DNN; and Case C: PAN’s Encoder output. Table 3 shows the
evaluation results on the driver behavior recognition App for three cases. In Case A with raw image input, the
driver classification accuracy (utility) by App is 98.2%, while the adversary’s accuracy of predicting the private
attribute, i.e., driver identity, is 93.6%. In Case B of DNN feature input, the utility of classifying driver behavior is
96.1%, and the private driver identity inference accuracy p1 by the malicious attacker is 65.6%. It indicates that
both the raw data and DNN feature cases reveal private attribute-correlated information. As for Case C with
PAN’s Encoder output, it incurs an improvement (0.9%) in driver behavior recognition accuracy, and reduce the
private identity prediction accuracy p1 by 70.5%. Meanwhile, the intuitive reconstruction privacy p2 in Case C
is 0.163, which is larger than that in Case B (0) and Case C (0.035). The more significant reconstruction error
implies the less private information leakage risk.
Summary. This outcome demonstrates PAN’s Encoder improves utility with quantified privacy guarantees.
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(a) DNN (b) Hybrid DNN (c) PAN
Fig. 6. Visualization of features learned by DNN, Hybrid method, and PAN’s Encoder on StateFarm (T6) datasets. Different
color in each figure standards for one task class.
Sailboat without “water”
Sailboat with “water”
Bus without “road”
Bus with “road”+
+
Sailboat Sailboat
Bus Bus
PAN DNN
Fig. 7. Detail visualization of feature learning by PAN and DNN on two categories of images from ImageNet (T3). The target
task is to classify the "sailboat" and "bus" image samples. The background "water" in "sailboat" images and the background
"road" in "bus" images are redundant (private) to recognize the target "sailboat" and "bus".
Raw PANDNNNoisy(DP)
“Bus” Image 1
“Bus” Image 2
Hybrid DNNNoisy(FL)
Fig. 8. Visualization of reconstruction privacy. From left to right: raw "bus" images from ImageNet (Raw), images with
Laplace noise (DP), images with carefully-calibrated Gaussian noise (FL), and images reconstructed from DNN’s features,
Hybrid DNN’s features, and PAN’s Encoder output.
4.6 Visualization of PAN’s Encoder Output
In this subsection, we further visualize the PAN’s Encoder output in terms of feature distribution and the
reconstruction privacy to seek insight into answering the following questions: what is the impact of PAN on the
learned features, how does PAN disentangle the feature components relevant to privacy from those relevant to
utility, and how well does PAN preserve the reconstruction privacy of raw data?
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4.6.1 Visualization of PAN’s Encoder Output on Feature Space. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 visualize how the feature manifold
is derived by DNN, DNN(resized), and PAN. First, in Fig. 6, PAN’s Encoder output is highly separable as DNN
method do on the feature space, which indicates its utility for task recognition. While the manifold driven by
the Hybrid baseline with PCA and noise addition processes on DNN features is blurry, this is why the resized
features by Hybrid DNN method hurt utility. Moreover, the feature distribution (manifold) formed by PAN is the
most constrictive one compared to that from the DNN and Hybrid baselines, which leads to the improved utility.
Second, PAN to push the features away from redundant private information, for privacy, makes the manifold
more constrictive, so that enhances the utility. Specifically, to zoom in on two categories of images from ImageNet
(T3) for more details about how PAN and DNN form the feature manifold to achieve utility-privacy tradeoff, as
shown in Fig. 7. The target task is to classify the two categories, "sailboat" and "bus". The private background
information in the "sailboat" raw image is "water", and the private information in the "bus" image is "road". We
see PAN pushes features towards the constrictive space dominated by the samples without redundant (private)
information, i.e., "sailboat without water" and "bus without road", which guarantees privacy, avoids over-fitting,
and improves utility as well. While the DNN method may capture the background (private) information "water"
and "road" and retain them in the feature manifold to help the target task classification of "sailboat" and "bus",
therefore hurts privacy. We defer the theoretical interpretation of this result to § 5.
4.6.2 Visualization of PAN’s Encoder output on Reconstruction Privacy. Fig. 8 visualizes the reconstruction privacy
of PAN’s Encoder output, in comparison to the baseline approaches, using two "bus" image samples from ImageNet.
We adopt the same architectures of encoder (i.e., 12 conv layers, 5 pooling layers, and 1 batch-normalization
layer) and privacy reconstructor (i.e., the encoder turned upside down) to decode the features generated by DNN,
Hybrid DNN, and PAN for fair comparison. We see the images reconstructed from the DNN features convey
the target object "bus" information and the private background "road" information, indicating a high risk of
private background leakage. Adding noise to the images in DP and FL or adding noise to the features in Hybrid
DNN baselines obfuscate both utility-related "bus" information and the privacy-correlated background "road"
information, compromising task detection accuracy (utility) at the cost of privacy. The PAN, instead, only muddles
the utility-irrelevant private information "road", making background information reconstruction impossible
without compromising the utility.
5 MANIFOLD BASED INTERPRETATION
Our evaluation reported above shows that PAN is able to train an Encoder that improves utility and accuracy at
the same time. This section attempts to provide a theoretical interpretation of this surprising result.
We resort to the manifold perspective of the deep model. It is common in literature to assume that the high-
dimensional raw data lies on a lower dimensional manifold [4]. A DNN can also be viewed as a parametric manifold
learner utilizing the nonlinear mapping of multi-layer architectures and connection weights. We decompose
the input data into two orthogonal lower dimensional manifolds: I = IOD + IOD⊥ . Here, the component IOD is
the manifold component that is both necessary and sufficient for task recognition (e.g. driver behavior). Thus,
ideally, we want our training algorithm to rely on this information for task recognition solely. Formally, for
the utility discriminator (UD), this implies that prob(y |I ) = prob(y |IOD ). And the other manifold component
IOD⊥ , orthogonal to IOD , may or may not contain information for the objective class, but it is dispensable for
task detection. In practice, the real data does have redundant correlations. Thus IOD⊥ may be learned for task
recognition, but unnecessary. However, revealing IOD⊥ is likely to contain some sensitive information (e.g. driver
identity information and background information) thus hurt the privacy. If we assume that there does exist a
sweet-spot tradeoff between utility and privacy, that we hope to find, then it must be the case that IOD is not
sensitive.
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Fig. 9. A new manifold pushed by PAN to form the feature extractor, i.e., Encoder, for better utility and privacy. The utility-
specified discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)) push it to contain IOD and IOD⊥ , and the privacy-imposed adversarial
training objective (Eq.(5)) pushes it away from the sensitive component IOD⊥ .
The features F learned by standard discriminative learning to minimize the classification error based on
information from I , will mostly likely overlap (non-zero projection) with both IOD and IOD⊥ . And the overlap
with IOD⊥ compromises the privacy (as evident from our experiments). Meanwhile, the projection of manifold
IOD on IOD⊥ is significant as it might capture other extra sensitive features, which will help task recognition
accuracy. Apart from privacy, the redundant correlation in IOD⊥ is also likely only be spurious in training data.
Thus, merely minimizing classification loss can lead to over-fitting.
This is where we can skill two birds with one stone via an adversarial process. In PAN, the Encoder E(·) is
trained by the utility-specified discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)) and privacy-imposed adversarial learning
objective (Eq.(5)), to remove extra sensitive information in features F ′ as shown in Fig. 9. The transformed
manifold formulated by Encoder E(·) is forced by discriminative learning objective (Eq.(2)), just like the traditional
approach, to contain information from both IOD as well as IOD⊥ . However, the adversarial training objective
(Eq.(5)) will push features F ′ away (or orthogonal) from IOD⊥ . In this way, we get privacy as well, since F ′ as a
function of I which has two manifolds, being orthogonal to IOD⊥ forces it to only depend on IOD .
Meanwhile, from a generalization perspective, in the training data, the spurious information from IOD⊥ that
might over-fit the training data is iteratively removed by the adversarial training objective (Eq.(5)), leading to
enhanced generalization. For example, as shown in Fig. 7, if we want to discriminate between "bus" and "sailboat",
the background information "road" in the image can help in most cases but can also mislead when the test image
contains a "sailboat" being transported on the "road". Therefore, by considering the background information, a
standard DNN may not generalize well. In contrast, because the background may contain sensitive information
and contribute to reconstruction error, PAN is likely to train the Encoder to remove information about the
background and as a result, improve the task accuracy .
The above interpretation highlights the possibility that utility and privacy are not completely competing
objectives in practice. We believe that a rigorous formalism and thorough investigation of this phenomena is
necessary to shed more insight and derive better designs.
6 RELATED WORK
Our work is inspired by and closely related to the following works.
Data Privacy Protection in Machine Learning based Services: Randomized noise addition [18] and Dif-
ferential privacy [1, 8] techniques are widely used by service providers to remove personal identities in the
released datasets. They provide strong privacy guarantees but often lead to a significant reduction in utility (as
shown in § 4.3). GAP [19] learns a privatization scheme to sanitize the datasets for limiting the risk of inference
attacks on personal private attributes. Erdogdu et al. design a privacy mapping scheme for continuously released
time-series of user data to protect the correlated private information in the dataset [11]. Federated learning [34, 39]
techniques prevent inference over the sensitive data exchanged between distributed parties during training by
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noisy aggregation of multiple parties’ resulting models. However, all of the above techniques are tailored to
datasets or the statistics of datasets, which are unsuitable to our problem settings, i.e., run-time data privacy
protection in the online inference phase. Meanwhile, applying the statistic information to a new context-aware
case is still an open problem.
PAN is a very different approach toward preserving the privacy at run-time. As the raw data is generated, it is
intercepted by a trained Encoder and the encoded features are then fed into the untrusted service.
Data Utility-Privacy Tradeoff using Adversarial Networks: Adversarial networks have been explored
for data privacy protection, in which two or more players defend against others with conflicting utility/privacy
goals. Seong et al. introduce an adversarial game to learn the image obfuscation strategy, in which the user
and recogniser (attacker) strive for antagonistic goals: dis-/enabling recognition [32]. Wu et al. [41] propose an
adversarial framework to learn the degradation transformation (e.g. anonymized video) of video inputs. This
framework optimizes the tradeoff between task performance and privacy budgets. However, both practices
only consider protecting privacy against attackers that perform "vision" recognition on specific data format (e.g.
image), which is insufficient across diverse data modalities in ubiquitous computing. On the contrary, PAN allow
users to specify the utility and privacy quantification towards different data formats according to application
requirements. And we have evaluated the PAN’s usability across image, audio, and motion data formats in § 4.
OLYMPUS [36] learns a data obfuscator (i.e., AutoEncoder) to jointly minimize privacy and utility loss, where the
privacy and utility requirements are modeled as adversarial networks.
Although the above works share the idea of adversarial learning with ours, they use the generative model to
obfuscate the raw data in a homomorphic way. In contrast, PAN uses the Encoder to learn a downsampling trans-
formation, e.g., features, from the raw data, and send the features, rather than any forms of obfuscated/synthetic
data, to service providers. A byproduct of this encoding is that PAN has more efficient data communication from
the mobile to the service provider.
Deep Feature Learning forUtility or Privacy: Edwards et al. propose the adversarial learned representations
that are both fair (independent of sensitive attributes) and discriminative for the prediction task [10]. However,
they target at fair decision by quantifying the dependence between representation and sensitive variables thus
provide no privacy guarantees. Our work is closely related to [3] that employs a variational GAN to learn the
representations that hide the personal identity and preserve the facial expression. However, it employs a generative
model to minimize the reconstruction error for realistic image synthesis, which is vulnerable to agnostic privacy
hacking by reverse engineering. In contrast, we maximize the reconstruction error for intuitive privacy-preserving.
Also, discriminative and generative models are widely studied for latent feature learning, improving task inference
but facilitating data reconstruction [35, 43]. They would make intuitive privacy protection even harder. Osia et
al. [33] employ a combination of dimensionality reduction, noise addition, and Siamese fine-tuning to preserve
privacy. Importantly both its dimensionality reduction and Siamese fine-tuning are based on discriminative
training. Specifically its Siamese fine-tuning seeks to reduce the intra-class variation in features amongst training
samples for the intended classification service. While the authors show these methods improve privacy, there is
no systematic way to make tradeoffs between privacy and utility. In contrast, PAN presents a rigorous mechanism
to discover good tradeoffs via a combination of discriminative, generative, and adversarial training. Mohammad
et al. [29] present a privacy-preserving transformation called Replacement AutoEncoder (RAE). Like the Encoder
in PAN, RAE also intends to eliminate sensitive information from the features while keeping the task-relevant
information. Importantly it assumes that features/data relevant to an intended task do not overlap with those
revealing sensitive information. As a result, it transforms the data by simply replacing the latter with features/data
that are irrelevant to the intended task and do not reveal sensitive information. With that assumption, RAE
eschews the hard problem of making a good tradeoff between utility and privacy and is also solely based on
discriminative training. Furthermore, RAE does not reduce the amount of data that have to be sent to the service
provider and would use significantly higher resources in transforming the data in which RAE will need to detect
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sensitive features/data, replace them, and then reconstruct the (modified) raw data. In contrast, PAN only needs to
run the dimensionality-reducing Encoder on the raw data and send the features to the service provider, although
PAN may require significantly more computational resources in training the Encoder, which is done off-line, in
the cloud.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper addresses the privacy concern when mobile users send their data to an untrusted service provider
for classification services. We present PAN, an adversarial framework to automatically generate deep features
from the raw data with quantified guarantees in privacy and utility. We report a prototype of PAN on Android
platforms and cloud servers. Evaluation using Android applications and benchmark datasets show that PAN’s
Encoder output attains a notably better privacy-utility tradeoff than known methods. To our surprise, it achieves
even better utility than standard DNNs that are completely ignorant of privacy. We surmise that this surprising
result can be understood from the perspective of manifold.
We also see three directions that the work reported in this paper can be extended. First, the PAN framework can
accommodate other choices of context-aware utility, such as the sequence prediction, and privacy quantification,
such as the information theory-based privacy, according to app requirements. Second, it can also integrate multiple
utility discriminators and privacy attackers to train the Encoder, given the appropriate datasets accompanied
by utility and privacy labels. Third, our experience shows that the training of multiple adversarial models
in PAN must be carefully synchronized to avoid model degradation caused by difference in their objectives
and convergence speeds. Therefore, more heuristics and insights for guaranteeing and accelerating training
convergence are much needed.
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